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Abstract 
This study explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC’s) interpretation of s. 
7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Considering that s. 7 of the Charter is one of 
the most expansive and influential portions of the purposive document, understanding the ways 
in which the interpretation of the section has changed throughout time, is quite valuable. The fact 
that even the supreme law of Canada can be understood and applied differently over time, is vital 
to understand. It then becomes possible to theorize and comprehend how interpretations may 
change in the future for s. 7, and for other portions of the Charter as well. The study begins by 
examining first, the judicial history of cases pertaining to the matter of assisted death in Canada. 
Dissecting the changed s. 7 interpretations found in the relevant cases, the study moves to then 
examine future implications that are significant to the matter of physician assisted death (PAD) 
in Canada. Speculations are provided on the future of the legislation surrounding medical 
assistance in dying (MAID), and on how the societal and judicial understanding of s. 7 and 
MAID are likely to change and further evolve.  
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The Interpretation of Assisted Death Under Section Seven of the Canadian Charter 
The matter of physician assisted death (PAD) has long been discussed and debated in 
Canada. The Court challenge brought forward in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General) [1993] publicized the issue and brought it to the forefront of considerations with 
respect to s. 7 of the Charter. Many of the principles of fundamental justice that are in effect 
today had yet to be developed and/or thoroughly explored when Rodriguez [1993] was most 
prominent. A hindsight view of the case suggests that the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) 
decision was reflective of such circumstances and limitations. Efforts to contest the absolute 
prohibition on assisted suicide were quashed at the time, and the appeal was struck down. The 
decision, while devastating to individuals seeking to obtain an assisted death in Canada, did not 
result in the complete abandonment of the battle to eventually legalize the practice.  
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] revived the issue of assisted death 
approximately two decades after the appeal in Rodriguez [1993] had been rejected by the SCC. 
The social and judicial landscape of Canada had changed significantly since Rodriguez [1993], 
and the final result of the appeal, showed very evidently, the scope and breadth of such changes. 
The fundamental justice principles of arbitrariness and overbreadth had been expanded, and the 
new principle of gross disproportionality, had been introduced. Landmark cases such as Canada 
(Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society [2011], and Canada (Attorney General) 
v. Bedford [2013] had resulted in the Court being able to further develop their interpretation of s. 
7, and thus solidify their stance on the issue of assisted death. The Court which had been so 
heavily divided in Rodriguez [1993], made a unanimous decision in Carter [2015], emphasizing 
that their stance on the matter of s. 7 and assisted death, was final.  
Refinement and progression have continued to occur in Canadian jurisprudence, and 
societal and legal interpretations of the Charter have been improved significantly. Prediction into 
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the future suggests that the understanding of the Charter will continue to evolve. The matter of 
assisted death itself has not yet been completely resolved and thus the Court’s understanding of 
pertinent Charter sections is likely to advance further. Canadian courts, while not necessarily the 
most progressive and forward thinking at times, have tended to make appropriate decisions 
which mirror not only the judicial view, but which tend also to be reflective of the collective 
view of certain issues. Evolving social and legal landscapes have served to shape societal and 
legal understandings, as is evident in the examination of cases relating to s. 7 and assisted death.  
The Rodriguez Case 
Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General) [1993] is the landmark case that 
jumpstarted the Supreme Court’s journey into thoroughly understanding and applying s. 7 of the 
Charter. Prior to the case having come to the attention of the Court, the interpretation of s. 7 was 
somewhat limited and underdeveloped. The Charter had been enacted only a few years before 
Rodriguez [1993] was heard at the SCC, and Rodriguez [1993] was the first case to truly pose a 
significant challenge to the SCC’s interpretation of s. 7.  
Case Facts 
Sue Rodriguez sought an assisted suicide when she was diagnosed with amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), and told that she had a brief and arduous life ahead (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 
530-531). Rodriguez’ quality of life would decrease significantly due to the debilitating nature of 
ALS (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 530-531). Choosing to continue life with the disease would mean that 
she would slowly lose the ability to perform even the most basic of tasks, which included not 
even being able to breathe without external assistance (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 530-531). 
Rodriguez chose to pursue the route of a medically assisted death when she knew that waiting for 
a natural death was not a viable, nor acceptable option (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 530-531). 
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Confident in her decision that assisted suicide was the correct choice, Rodriguez took her 
case to the courts; she wanted to continue living while life was still enjoyable, and leave when 
such was no longer the case (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 531). The major obstacle that Rodriguez faced 
in exercising her desires and free will, was that she knew that she would be physically unable to 
end her own life when that desire would arise (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 531). Medically assisted 
suicide was the only reasonable option in Rodriguez’ view, and thus she began the process of 
attempting to obtain the procedure in Canada (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 531). Despite having been 
struck down in the British Columbia Supreme Court, and in a split decision at the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, Rodriguez eventually took the case to the Supreme Court of Canada 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 532-543). Rodriguez argued that the prohibition on assisted suicide, found 
in s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code, was in violation of her ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) Charter rights.  
Rodriguez’ Section Seven Argument 
The Charter states in s.7, that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice” (Canadian Charter, 1982, s. 7). Currently, the principles of fundamental 
justice applicable to s. 7 matters, include overbreadth, arbitrariness, vagueness, and more 
recently, gross disproportionality (Carter, 2015, pp. 375-378). Viewing the Charter as a 
purposive document, it is evident that the guarantee of rights and liberties found in s. 7 of the 
Charter is fundamental (Downie, 2004, pp. 51-53). The section helps to ensure that underlying 
Charter values such as liberty, autonomy, dignity, and equality, among many others, are 
maintained and protected (Downie, 2004, pp. 51-61). In addition, s. 7 acts as a base to many of 
the other important rights and liberties that Canadians hold in society. The fundamental Charter 
section helps ensure that Canadians are also able to enjoy the legal rights found in ss. 8- 14 of the 
Charter (Downie, 2004, pp. 50-61).  
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Rodriguez’ s. 7 argument was based on the notion that her liberty and security of the 
person rights were being violated by s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 520). 
Rodriguez argued that s. 241(b) was problematic to liberty and security of the person, as it 
essentially prevented her from exercising personal autonomy over her own body (Rodriguez, 
1993, p. 521). The impugned section barred Rodriguez from feeling as though she could live the 
rest of her life in a dignified manner, have control over her body, and also prevented her from 
feeling as though she was free from governmental control regarding personal decisions 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 583).  
The protection afforded by s. 7, Rodriguez argued, included the ability for one to be able 
to choose the manner and timing of their own death, and thus to die with dignity (Rodriguez, 
1993, p. 584). As explained by Cory J. (1993), death is a major aspect of human life, and if 
human life is afforded protection and dignity under s. 7, it follows that the integral component of 
death, must also be provided such protections (p. 630). Forcing an individual such as Sue 
Rodriguez to wait to die a natural death would violate her human dignity; it would mean that she 
would die with a very poor quality of life; and it would also mean that she would die feeling that 
she had absolutely no control and was completely powerless to make decisions about her own 
body and life (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 629-630). Rodriguez alleged that her security of the person 
and liberty interests were being violated by s. 241(b), as she was not being given the right to die 
in a dignified manner, or essentially in a manner that allowed her to exercise rightful control over 
her own person (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 584).  
Rodriguez’ Section Twelve Argument 
The Charter states in s. 12 that “everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel 
and unusual treatment or punishment” (Canadian Charter, 1982, s. 12). The section is aimed at 
protecting individuals from being treated unfairly by the Canadian government, and more 
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particularly, by the Canadian criminal justice system. The rights found in s. 12 aim to ensure that 
the treatment or punishment received is appropriate, and not disproportionate or unjustifiable in 
any manner. The Charter section serves to protect Canadian values such as human dignity and 
fairness (Downie, 2004, pp. 56-59). 
 Rodriguez’ s. 12 argument was centered around the idea that by not allowing her to 
obtain a physician assisted death, the government was subjecting Rodriguez to a form of 
punishment and/or treatment, that was cruel and unusual (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 534). Rodriguez 
sought a physician assisted death because she knew that suffering from ALS would mean that 
her quality of life would decrease significantly, as she would eventually lose all external and 
internal bodily function (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 530-531). In Rodriguez’ view, living until natural 
death was not a viable option, as it would mean that she would not be able to continue living life 
in a manner with which she was comfortable (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 530-531). She would have to 
endure a significant amount of pain and suffering, lose her sense of self, and sense of self 
respect, as well (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 530-531).  
 Rodriguez argued that the federal government’s refusal to allow her to choose the manner 
and timing of her death, basically constituted cruel and unusual punishment and treatment, as 
such a refusal forced her to live life in a manner that she found to be utterly unacceptable 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 533-534). Declaring s. 241(b) unconstitutional would mean that human 
dignity, life, liberty, and security of the person were protected; not doing so, would not only 
violate s. 7 and be an affront to human dignity, it would also subject certain individuals to cruel 
and unusual punishment and treatment, in that it would force them to continue living while 
suffering heavily (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 533-534). Furthermore, s. 241(b) violated Rodriguez’ s. 
12 rights, she argued, because it forced cruel and unusual punishment and treatment only on 
those that could not choose the manner and timing of their death without aid (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 
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534). In essence, the impugned legislation resulted in vulnerable individuals enduring cruel and 
unusual punishment and treatment, simply because they sought a physician assisted death 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 534).  
Rodriguez’ Section Fifteen Argument 
S. 15(1) of the Charter is aimed at ensuring that every human person in Canada is free 
from being impacted by discrimination (Canadian Charter, 1982, s. 15(1)). The section states: 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, 
without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, 
sex, age or mental or physical disability. (Canadian Charter, 1985, s. 15(1)) 
The Charter section attempts “… to promote a society in which all persons enjoy equal 
recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society, equally capable 
and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration…” (Downie, 2004, p. 59). 
The rights guarantee found in s. 15(1) ensures that underlying Charter values such as 
dignity, equality, and liberty, are among those protected (Downie, 2004, pp. 51-61), by 
stating that individuals are equal both before, and under the law, and by stating that 
individuals should receive equal protections and benefits from the law as well (Canadian 
Charter, 1982, s. 15(1)). The equality guarantee found in s. 15(1) aims to ensure that 
individuals in Canada are not made to experience discrimination and hardship due to 
certain attributes and characteristics, and that the law generally treats all individuals as 
equal to one another (Canadian Charter, 1982, s. 15(1)). 
 The s. 15(1) claim presented by Rodriguez suggested that the prohibitions on assisted 
suicide in s. 241(b), unlawfully discriminated against those individuals that would be unable to 
end their lives without external help (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 534-535). The impugned provision 
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essentially restricted those with disabilities from being able to choose the manner and timing of 
their death, simply because they could not physically execute such decisions on their own 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 534-535). The main issue arose in the fact that individuals living without 
disabilities, were free to choose when and how they died; no such restriction was imposed upon 
any other person in Canada, with regards to their end-of-life decisions (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 544).  
The Supreme Court’s Decision 
 The Section Seven Decision. 
The Supreme Court of Canada split heavily in its decision for Rodriguez [1993]. The 
dissent, which was comprised of Lamer C. J., L'Heureux‑Dubé, Cory, and McLachlin JJ., 
actually consisted of three groups with differing opinions. The majority on the other hand, which 
consisted of La Forest, Sopinka, Gonthier, Iacobucci, and Major JJ., came to the conclusion that 
s. 241(b) should be upheld (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 615).  
The s. 7 analysis provided by the majority revolved around determining first, if 
Rodriguez’ s. 7 rights had been violated by s. 241(b); and second, if such violations were 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 583). Rodriguez had 
argued that her s. 7 security of the person and liberty rights were being violated by the impugned 
provision, as she was not being given the opportunity to die with dignity, or to have control over 
her own body, or to be free from external interference (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 583-584). 
Interestingly, the majority agreed with Rodriguez, conceding to the fact that s. 241(b) did in fact 
constitute a violation in terms of security of the person, and liberty (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 583). 
 In the majority analysis, Sopinka J. also emphasized that the value of life had been 
engaged as well (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 584-586). Rodriguez’ desire to pursue an assisted death, 
the SCC alleged, suggested that she had essentially chosen death over life; this meant that the s. 
7 value of life had been brought into the discussion, and needed to be considered (Rodriguez, 
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1993, p. 585-586). In the decision-making process, the majority brought forth the notion that no 
singular s. 7 value could be given supremacy or preference over another. While the SCC 
acknowledged the fact that s. 241(b) violated Rodriguez’ security of the person and liberty rights, 
they could not disregard the fact that a value protecting sanctity of life, had also been engaged 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 584-586). Significant attention was drawn to the fact that all of the values 
protected by s. 7 were of equal importance; if sanctity of life was a value protected by s. 7, then 
it could not be ignored simply because security of the person and liberty were at stake 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 584-586).  
Having acknowledged that s. 241(b) infringed upon Rodriguez’ s. 7 rights, the SCC 
began examining the underlying Charter values that s. 7 sought to protect (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 
585-586). The majority found that s. 7 affirmed societal notions that human life should be 
afforded a high degree of dignity and respect, and in essence that human life should be protected 
whenever possible (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 585). The analysis proved to the majority that the 
impugned provision should be upheld, as maintaining the assisted suicide prohibition would in 
turn ensure that the sanctity of human life was not violated (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, pp. 273-
275). The SCC also found that sanctity of life had only ever focused on preserving life 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 585). The value had not yet been associated with suicide or assisted suicide, 
and the Court was therefore unwilling to regulate such matters, or deem them acceptable 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 585). The lack of shift in the societal understanding and expectations 
surrounding sanctity of life, lead the majority to conclude that the provision in question, should 
be upheld (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, pp. 273-274). The majority found that legalizing assisted 
suicide would not only make constitutional the notion that choosing to die was acceptable, it 
would undermine core Charter and societal values (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 585-586).  
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The SCC rationale consisted also of a walkthrough of relevant precedent relating to 
security of the person, and an explanation of how the s. 7 value evolved over time (Rodriguez, 
1993, pp. 586-588). R. v. Morgentaler [1988] was an influential precedent case that helped 
inform not only the general decision, but helped to define security of the person (Rodriguez, 
1993, pp. 586-587). Sopinka J. delved into the varying definitions for security of the person, 
mentioning that Beetz J. defined the s. 7 value with relation to abortion, as one that helped ensure 
that individuals would be able to obtain medical treatment without fear of criminal sanction 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 586). Dickson C. J. in the Morgentaler [1988] case, provided a definition of 
security of the person that was not limited only to abortion; he suggested that the value was one 
of great importance that would result in serious harm to individuals if withheld, as it protected 
“… physical or mental integrity and one’s control over these…” (as cited in Rodriguez, 1993, p. 
587). In addition, Wilson J. in agreement with Dickson C. J., stated that the s. 7 value “protects 
both the physical and psychological integrity of the individual” (as cited in Rodriguez, 1993, p. 
587). In essence, the consensus from the Morgentaler [1988] decision for security of the person, 
was that personal autonomy should be protected, that the state should avoid potentially causing 
any type of mental stress, and that the state thus should have very limited interference with an 
individual’s bodily integrity (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 587-588). The explanations for security of the 
person found in Morgentaler [1988] lead the majority in Rodriguez to believe that s. 241(b) 
violated s. 7, as the impugned provision negatively impacted individuals’ bodily integrity, and 
could cause psychological stress as well (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 587-589).  
Having made the determination that the assisted suicide prohibition violated s. 7, the 
majority went on to examine whether the principles of fundamental justice were also being 
breached. Before starting the analysis fully, Sopinka J. made a point to mention that while it 
would be the responsibility of the Court to ensure that no Charter violation was occurring, it 
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would also be important to ensure that longstanding values and principles were not being 
unnecessarily changed (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 589-590). Perhaps one of the most important and 
influential aspects of the majority decision, Sopinka J. discussed the manner in which principles 
of fundamental justice should be determined, and what criteria effective and useful fundamental 
justice principles satisfy (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 590-592). Principles of fundamental justice, 
Sopinka J. argued, should be legal principles that are able to yield tangible results, and be 
applicable in reality, as well as those that are, “… vital or fundamental to our societal notion of 
justice…” (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 590). Such principles while founded on societal notions of ethics 
and morality in some sense, would need to avoid being overly abstract or vague, to ensure that 
they could be legitimately administered within the Canadian criminal justice system (Rodriguez, 
1993, pp. 590-591).  
Despite the notion that a historical approach would help the Court to understand relevant 
principles in a case, Sopinka J. suggested that a historically focused analysis would not truly be 
beneficial in helping decide if a Charter violation had indeed occurred (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 
591-592). Historical legislation would only support the notion that the impugned provision 
should be upheld, considering that it would not have been consistently amended to reflect 
advances in the relevant fields (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 591-592). In addition, longstanding 
precedent would suggest that legislation remain as is, because of its continued existence in such a 
state, and due to a lack of successful challenges (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 591-592). Attempting to 
ensure that the Court was not relying solely on tradition and precedent to make a decision 
regarding the principles of fundamental justice in the present case, Sopinka J. advised that the 
Court consider not only the reasoning that supports the prohibition, but also the underlying 
principles (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 592).  
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Rodriguez argued that human dignity and autonomy should be seen as principles of 
fundamental justice by the Courts, and that the obvious violation of such values in the present 
case, was unconstitutional (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 592). Although the majority found the values of 
human dignity, autonomy, and self-determination, to be those that helped inform many Charter 
rights, and even many principles of fundamental justice, they did not agree that the values could 
be considered to be fundamental justice principles in themselves (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 592-593). 
Suggesting that human dignity should be a fundamental justice principle, would mean that any 
violation of s. 7 in terms of life, liberty, or security of the person, would automatically constitute 
a violation of fundamental justice (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, pp. 259-260). In essence, to suggest 
that a value underlying s. 7 and many other Charter sections, could be viewed as a principle of 
fundamental justice itself, would make the whole notion of the principles moot; an Oakes 
analysis would perhaps be more logical to pursue, if a preliminary s. 7 violation would 
automatically constitute a fundamental justice violation, as there would be absolutely no need for 
the additional step of the principles (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 592-593).  
Explaining the majority rationale further, Sopinka J. also emphasized the importance of 
balancing individual interests and those of the state (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 592-594). While 
infringements upon individual rights and freedoms are undoubtedly concerning, the Charter has 
always recognized the notion that state interests must also be considered; the state focuses on 
protecting society as a whole, and maintaining a fair balance between the two opposing sides 
(Rodriguez, 1993 p. 593), through measures such as the principles of fundamental justice, and 
the s. 1 Oakes analysis. While the majority recognized the importance of ensuring that 
Rodriguez’ rights and liberties were not unnecessarily being infringed upon, they noted that an 
important aspect of the decision, was to focus on the rationalization behind the impugned 
provision (Rodriguez, 1993 p. 593). Consideration of varying angles within a case would be key 
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in determining whether a violation existed, and to make a decision in general. In the Rodriguez 
case, the issue being considered was whether the state interest of protecting sanctity of life and 
vulnerable individuals, was achieved through a complete assisted suicide prohibition (Rodriguez, 
1993 pp. 594-595).  
The blanket prohibition found in s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code, was described as having 
the objective of protecting the sanctity of human life, by providing both dignity and respect 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 595). The state suggested that vulnerable individuals, such as those that 
could potentially be coerced or forced into assisted suicide, would be at risk if the prohibition 
were to be removed, and also that the respect that society has historically held on preserving 
human life, would be diminished as well (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). Taking a brief 
historical approach, the majority drew attention to the fact that Canadian society has often 
chosen to protect, rather than harm human life, through initiatives such as those that abolished 
capital punishment, and allowed actions such as assault and murder, to be considered criminal 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). The opposing side, which suggested that sanctity and 
preservation of life should not necessarily trump the desire to live a life of better quality, or to 
exercise one’s desires freely, was also considered in the analysis (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). 
Additional support for the appellant’s argument was seen through the fact that disciplines outside 
of law, such as science and medicine, supported decriminalization, and because measures 
allowing the withdrawal and/or refusal of medical treatment, were available at the time 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 596-599).  
 The Court then delved into the assisted death legislation of other Western countries as a 
last attempt to support the lifting of the prohibition, however the examination generally proved 
that the impugned legislation should remain in place (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 601-605). The 
majority found that many other countries held similar values to Canada in terms of the sanctity 
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and preservation of human life and thus that activities such as aiding and abetting in the suicide 
of another were often prohibited (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 602-603). Concerns regarding a “slippery 
slope” into illegal forms of ending life were prevalent in the examination, and issues with 
implementing adequate safeguards, were also found (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 602-605). Focused on 
ensuring that individuals would be free from coercion and abuse, the majority found the blanket 
prohibition on assisted suicide to be the most favourable option, despite the fact that some 
individuals such as Sue Rodriguez, would be deprived of their s. 7 rights and liberties 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p.605). 
After considering all aspects brought forward by the by the appellants and respondents, 
the majority came to the conclusion that no principles of fundamental justice were violated 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 609). The majority emphasized the intentions surrounding end-of-life 
decisions, suggesting that the current system which supported a natural death, was favourable in 
comparison to one that would allow a forced death (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 607-608). It was noted 
that as a large portion of the Canadian justice system is centered around intentions in the form of 
mens rea, that the intentions behind end-of-life decisions, should also be afforded a high degree 
of attention (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 607-608). A lack of consensus in terms of wanting to preserve 
human life whenever possible, or allowing people to be self-determinate, discouraged the 
majority in finding a violation with regards to fundamental justice (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, pp. 
273-274). In addition, the SCC was hesitant to suggest that suicide would be found acceptable in 
any situation, and was also concerned with the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent abuse in 
such permanent end-of-life care decisions (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 607-608). The majority 
concluded that although s. 241(b) did violate Rodriguez’ security of the person and liberty rights, 
that no principles of fundamental justice had been violated (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 608).  
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The Section Twelve Decision. 
The majority decision surrounding the s. 12 claim presented by Rodriguez, was very 
brief, as it was found that s.12 did not actually apply to the case (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 609-612). 
Sopinka J. clarified that for a s. 12 claim to take effect, the claimant would first need to prove 
that the state was subjecting an individual to a certain treatment and/or punishment; and second, 
that said treatment and/or punishment, was cruel and unusual (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 609). The 
argument advanced by the appellant in the Rodriguez [1993] case was that the blanket 
prohibition constituted cruel and unusual punishment, as it forced Rodriguez to end her life in a 
manner which she did not see fit, despite her very adamantly desiring an assisted suicide 
(Rodriguez, 1993, p. 609). 
Sopinka J. found that denial of access to assisted suicide did not constitute punishment by 
any means (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 609). However, some speculation was afforded to the idea that 
the denial could be seen as cruel and unusual treatment (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 609). The majority 
eventually found that as the treatment was not directly being caused by the state and because 
Rodriguez was not in the hands of the state, that no treatment was being imposed upon her 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 609-612). Rodriguez was simply being subjected to the same criminal 
provisions as all other Canadians through the Criminal Code; no cruel or unusual treatment could 
be seen as having been applied, as the only issue was due to Rodriguez’ special circumstances 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 609-612).  
The Section Fifteen Decision. 
The majority found that s. 241(b) violated s. 15, as the prohibition either deprived certain 
individuals of their right, or subjected them to a burden (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 612). Sopinka J. 
suggested that the two main issues regarding s. 15, were first whether the discrimination claim 
could be supported, as the provision denied assisted suicide to all disabled people regardless of if 
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they were terminally ill; and second if the assisted suicide deprivation would be beneficial or 
burdensome (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 612-613). The majority declined to consider any s. 15 issues, 
as they found that s. 1 would save the provision regardless (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 613-614). In 
addition, the majority briefly went through an Oakes analysis, and found that s. 241(b) met the 
criteria of pressing and substantial, rational connection, minimal impairment, and the balancing 
of salutary and deleterious effects (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 613-615). Upholding the provision was 
the most favourable and logical option from every aspect in the view of the majority, and thus no 
issues were found with regards to s. 15 (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 613-615).  
Concluding their analysis, the majority decided that the appeal should be dismissed 
without costs (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 615). No s. 12 applicability was found, and despite the fact 
that a s. 7 violation was found for security of the person and liberty, it was determined that no 
principles of fundamental justice had been violated by the impugned provision (Rodriguez, 1993, 
p. 608). Similarly, while, a s. 15 violation was acknowledged, an Oakes analysis would prove 
that the infringement was reasonable (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 615). The assisted suicide prohibition 
while undoubtedly problematic in some aspects, was overall found to be sound, and more 
favourable if upheld (Rodriguez, 1993, p. 631). 
The Carter Case 
Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] has already proven to be a very 
iconic and influential case in Canadian jurisprudence. The case has now created 
precedent over the previous SCC decision in Rodriguez [1993], and essentially resulted in 
the matter of assisted death coming full circle. The unanimous decision served to clarify 
the Court’s stance on the matters of assisted death discussed in Rodriguez [1993], and 
more importantly, sent the message that the Court had advanced not only their view of s. 
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7, but also developed a strong understanding of how to apply and interpret the 
fundamental Charter section. 
Case Facts 
 Decision at the British Columbia Supreme Court. 
 The assisted suicide prohibition found in s. 241(b) of the Criminal Code, proved to have 
significant adverse impacts on many individuals, including Kay and Lee Carter, Hollis Johnson, 
William Shoichet, those represented by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, and 
also for Gloria Taylor (Carter, 2015, p. 331). A newfound and renewed momentum for the push 
to decriminalize assisted suicide in Canada, was expressed to the courts when Gloria Taylor was 
diagnosed with ALS in 2009 (Carter, 2015, p. 346). Taylor did not want to die naturally through 
a slow and painful process, and just as Sue Rodriguez, she instead preferred to end her life by 
obtaining an assisted death (Carter, 2015, pp. 346-347).  
The five appellants claimed that s. 241(b) violated s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter, and thus 
chose to bring the matter to the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2012 (Carter, 2015, pp. 346-
347). Smith J. began the decision by thoroughly examining information and data available with 
regards to assisted death (Carter, 2015, pp. 353-357). The first part of the trial judge’s analysis 
began with an examination into end-of-life care in Canada that was available at the time, and was 
concluded with the idea that assisted death would be found socially acceptable in certain 
circumstances (Carter, 2015, pp. 353-354).  
Practices that bring death about much faster than natural, such as palliative sedation and 
the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment, were already available in Canada, and generally 
seen as ethical and acceptable (Carter, 2015, p. 353). The trial judge found that a general 
consensus existed among physicians and ethicists, that assisted death was not more ethically 
heinous than other end-of-life care practices (Carter, 2015, pp. 353-354). Thus, many Canadian 
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physicians would feel comfortable with assisted death, if it were to be legalized (Carter, 2015, 
pp. 353-354). The examination into Canadian end-of-life care, lead Smith J. to conclude that 
assisted death would generally be seen as ethically and morally acceptable in Canada, provided 
that those eligible for the practice were competent adults that were choosing the practice of their 
own free will, and also suffering from a grievous and irremediable medical condition (Carter, 
2015, p. 354).  
Continuing her analysis, the trial judge went on to examine data and evidence from other 
countries, which had already legalized some form of assisted dying (Carter, 2015, pp. 354-355). 
Smith J. reviewed the various safeguards each regime had implemented to protect the vulnerable 
against abuse, and also the effectiveness of such safeguards (Carter, 2015, p. 354). Smith J. 
concluded that safeguards were generally adhered to, that other rules and regulations were 
effective in preventing abuse, and that fears of coercion, misuse, and the exploitation of a 
permissive assisted death system, had not come to fruition in any examined regime (Carter, 
2015, p. 354). Warning against taking evidence from other countries too seriously, Smith J. 
suggested that the relevant data had shown that assisted suicide systems could be implemented 
safely and effectively, without negatively impacting palliative care, or deteriorating a respect for 
life (Carter, 2015, p. 355).  
The trial judge also explored the risks surrounding assisted suicide, and the options 
available to manage and minimize those risks (Carter, 2015, p. 355). Evidence proved to the 
Court that physicians would be able to effectively guard against coercion and abuse surrounding 
end-of-life care practices, and also that they would be able to accurately determine competence 
and the voluntary desire for assisted death (Carter, 2015, p. 355). In addition, Smith J. found that 
measures such as informed consent practices, would help ensure that patients did not make 
decisions with haste, or under some type of external influence (Carter, 2015, p. 355). Assisted 
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suicide in Canada, Smith J. suggested, would be possible and safe, provided that the potential 
risks were minimized through a “… carefully designed system… that imposes strict limits that 
are scrupulously monitored and enforced” (Carter, 2015, p. 355).  
Rodriguez [1993] had set binding precedent for assisted suicide related matters, and thus 
the decision to reconsider the same matter in a lower Court was somewhat difficult for Smith J. 
(Carter, 2015, pp. 355-356). Despite the binding SCC decision, Smith J. concluded that it would 
in fact be appropriate to revisit the matter, as the new case had come at a time after many 
changes had occurred not only with the Canadian interpretation of s. 7, but with the Canadian 
and international understanding and acceptance of assisted death in certain situations (Carter, 
2015, pp. 355-356). The trial judge cited that the s. 7 value of life had not previously been 
considered within the realm of assisted suicide; that the fundamental justice principles of 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality had not yet been developed nor considered; that the s. 
15 violation was not thoroughly addressed; and that the changes made to the s. 1 analysis based 
on Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony [2009], had not yet been developed or applied 
in the Rodriguez [1993] decision (Carter, 2015, pp. 355-356). The changes that had taken place 
since Rodriguez [1993], in addition with the changed Canadian landscape, allowed Smith J. to 
apply new knowledge to the Carter [2015] decision, despite opposing precedent (Carter, 2015, 
pp. 354-357).  
Smith J. concluded after having conducted intensive research into the matter, that the 
assisted suicide prohibition violated both s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter in an inexcusable and 
unjustifiable manner (Carter, 2015, pp. 356-358). The judge found that the three values of life, 
liberty, and security of the person, had been engaged by the provision in question, and that the 
principles of overbreadth and gross disproportionality had been violated (Carter, 2015, p. 357). 
It was found that liberty was impinged upon, as anyone seeking an assisted suicide would be 
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subjected to state interference into their personal decisions, that security of the person was 
violated because individuals were being deprived of autonomy and self-determination with 
regards to their own bodies, and that the value of life was being harmed because the provision 
introduced the potential that some individuals would end their lives prematurely, while it was 
still possible to do so without aid (Carter, 2015, p. 357).  
The prohibition was also found to be unnecessarily broad (Carter, 2015, p. 357). It 
imposed an absolute prohibition on assisted suicide when it had been seen that systems that 
offered such end-of-life care practices could be used safely as long as certain precautions were 
introduced (Carter, 2015, p. 357). In addition, the provision was also seen as imposing a grossly 
disproportionate negative impact on those individuals that would be unable to execute their end-
of-life decisions without aid (Carter, 2015, p. 357). The effect of the prohibition included 
consequences such as individuals taking their lives prematurely; suffering through to a natural 
death despite not wanting to do so; losing a sense of personhood and/or self-dignity; and 
potentially imposing criminal sanction on another individual that provides illegal aid (Carter, 
2015, p. 357). The trial judge also found that s. 241(b) could not be deemed acceptable under s. 1 
of the Charter, and thus declared it unconstitutional and void (Carter, 2015, p. 357).  
The examination into constitutionality also indicated to Smith J., that the impugned 
provision violated s. 15 of the Charter (Carter, 2015, p. 356). Smith J. stated that s. 241(b), 
“…imposed a disproportionate burden on persons with physical disabilities…” (Carter, 2015, p. 
356), and that it essentially singled out the physically disabled by forcing them to resort to 
drastic means to be able to take control of their end-of-life decisions (Carter, 2015, p. 356). The 
trial judge found that the discrimination inflicted upon the physically disabled was unacceptable, 
and that it could not be justified under s. 1; while the provision met the first three aspects of the 
Oakes criteria, in that the reasoning behind the provision was well intentioned, the law failed at 
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minimum impairment (Carter, 2015, p. 356). Smith J. proposed that the government revisit the 
issue of assisted suicide, to implement a system that would be less impairing and achieve 
governmental objectives, while also achieving the needs and desires of negatively impacted 
individuals (Carter, 2015, p. 356).  Smith J. found in conclusion, that s. 241(b) was 
unconstitutional, and thus ordered a suspension of invalidity, while also providing Gloria Taylor 
with a constitutional exemption (Carter, 2015, p. 357).  
Decision at the British Columbia Court of Appeal. 
The Canadian government chose to appeal the trial decision, and the matter was thus 
heard at the British Columbia Court of Appeal, in 2013 (Carter, 2015, p. 358). The most 
controversial and pressing issue considered in Court at the time, was that the trial judge had 
deviated from the precedent set in Rodriguez [1993], and formulated a completely unique 
decision (Carter, 2015, p. 358). Although Smith J. had thoroughly discussed and explained the 
logic behind her choice to depart from the decision in Rodriguez [1993], the majority in the 
Appeal Court did not share the same beliefs (Carter, 2015, p. 358). Comprised of Newbury and 
Saunders JJ. A., the majority expressed that the reasoning applied in the trial had been flawed, 
and that, “… neither the change in legislative and social facts nor the new legal 
issues…permitted a departure from Rodriguez” (Carter, 2015, p. 358).  
The majority revisited the case, and found that the trial judge had erred in much of the 
decision that had been rendered (Carter, 2015, p. 358). Perhaps most significant, Newbury and 
Saunders JJ. A., found that the introduction of the two new principles of fundamental justice, 
since Rodriguez, did not actually provide sufficient grounds to revisit the matter and depart from 
precedent (Carter, 2015, p. 358). In addition, the majority suggested that contrary to the trial 
judge’s claim that the SCC had declined to consider a violation of the s. 7 value of life, the Court 
had in fact found that no such violation existed (Carter, 2015, p. 358). The majority also found 
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that the s. 15 claim had been considered and then dismissed in Rodriguez [1993], as it was found 
that s. 1 would have deemed the infringement to be reasonable (Carter, 2015, pp. 358-359). 
Similarly, an Oakes analysis for s. 7 would have resulted in any infringements being seen as 
reasonable (Carter, 2015, pp. 358-359). Concluding their analysis into the decision made at the 
lower Court, the majority at the Court of Appeal, found that the decision rendered in Rodriguez 
[1993] required adherence (Carter, 2015, p. 359).  
The dissent at the British Columbia Court of Appeal, generally agreed with the findings 
presented by the trial judge (Carter, 2015, pp. 359-360). Although agreeing with the precedent 
set in Rodriguez [1993], that the s. 15 claim would need to be dismissed due to it being saved by 
s. 1, Finch C. J. B. C., found that the analysis conducted by Smith J., was correct (Carter, 2015, 
pp. 359-360). The dissent at the Court of Appeal, found that, “... the trial judge’s assessment of 
stare decisis, her application of s. 7, … [and] the corresponding analysis under s. 1” (Carter, 
2015, p. 359), was well reasoned, and generally sound (Carter, 2015, pp. 359-360).   
Appellant Claims to the Supreme Court of Canada 
The appellants advanced the claim that s. 241(b) violated both ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter 
(Carter, 2015, p. 360). The first main argument presented, was that the impugned provision 
violated all three values meant to be protected by s. 7, in that it forced additional and prolonged 
suffering onto competent adults already suffering from grievous and irremediable medical 
conditions (Carter, 2015, p. 360). The second claim argued, was that s. 241(b) discriminated 
against the physically disabled by singling them out, and depriving them of their right to be 
treated as equals (Carter, 2015, p. 360). The appellants suggested that the alleged Charter 
violations were unconstitutional, and sought an appropriate remedy to alleviate the resulting 
harms (Carter, 2015, p. 360). 
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The Supreme Court Decision 
 Preliminary Issues. 
 The decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Carter [2015], was among the most 
iconic and influential judgements from the Court. The understanding of s. 7 implemented in 
Rodriguez [1993], while very informed and insightful for the time, was very much 
underdeveloped, in comparison to the understanding that came about after the PHS Community 
Services Society [2011], and Bedford [2013] cases had been decided. The Court made use of 
Carter [2015] to provide a judgement that clearly expressed their fully developed interpretation 
of s. 7, especially in relation to assisted death, while also emphasizing their unified stance. 
 The inquiry into the constitutionality of s. 241(b) in relation to ss. 7 and 15, first began 
with the consideration of two auxiliary issues of jurisdiction (Carter, 2015, p. 360). A major and 
controversial component of the Carter [2015] case before it had come before the SCC, was that 
the trial judge had gone against the precedent set in Rodriguez [1993], and that the Appeal Court 
had disproved of the action (Carter, 2015, pp. 359-360). The SCC, while acknowledging that 
precedent from higher Courts was generally not to be opposed, noted that specific circumstances, 
did in fact warrant reconsideration of higher Court decisions (Carter, 2015, p. 361).  
McLachlin C. J., speaking for the unanimous Court in Carter [2015], stated that, “… trial 
courts may reconsider settled rulings of higher courts… (1) where a new legal issue is raised; and 
(2) where there is a change in the circumstances or evidence that “fundamentally shifts the 
parameters of the debate” (Carter, 2015, p. 361). As the fundamental justice principles of 
overbreadth and gross disproportionality had not yet been developed, nor considered in 
Rodriguez [1993], the Court found it to be clear that the legal framework had changed 
significantly (Carter, 2015, pp. 361-362). Furthermore, a newfound abundance of evidence 
surrounding the benefits, risks, and safety of assisted suicide systems, proved to the SCC that the 
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evidence parameter had been met as well (Carter, 2015, pp. 361-362). Although the Court 
disagreed that the advancements to the s. 1 analysis, introduced in Hutterian Brethren, could 
warrant a reconsideration of s. 15, they did find that the general differences in the two cases, 
would allow for a re-visitation of the Rodriguez decision (Carter, 2015, pp. 362-363). The case 
facts lead the SCC to believe that the actions of the trial judge were appropriate, and the Court 
therefore was in full support of Smith J. (Carter, 2015, pp. 361-363). 
The second auxiliary issue the Court considered, was whether Parliament had wrongfully 
infringed upon provincial jurisdiction into health care matters, by imposing an absolute 
prohibition on assisted suicide (Carter, 2015, p. 363). The appellants had advanced the claim that 
the impugned prohibition was unconstitutional. It violated the doctrine of interjurisdictional 
immunity, which suggests that, “…the heads of power in ss. 91 and 92  are “exclusive”, and 
therefore each have a “minimum and unassailable” core of content that is immune from the 
application of legislation enacted by the other level of government” (Carter, 2015, p. 363). The 
Court, although agreeing that the provinces hold power over a realm of health care matters, 
required that the appellants prove that s. 241(b), violated that specific set of exclusively 
provincial health care issues (Carter, 2015, p. 363). The submission from the appellants was 
found to be too vague and ambiguous to truly distinguish provincial and federal jurisdiction, and 
as done in PHS Community Services Society [2011], the Court decided that “… both Parliament 
and the provinces may validly legislate on the topic” (Carter, 2015, pp. 363-365).  
Section Seven. 
The s. 7 analysis at the SCC began with an examination into each value encompassed by 
the Charter section, followed by a determination of whether the principles of fundamental justice 
were being violated (Carter, 2015, pp. 365- 384). Beginning with the right to life, McLachlin C. 
J. established that the value had indeed been engaged by the impugned provision, using the 
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reasons provided by the trial judge in the British Columbia Supreme Court (Carter, 2015, p. 
366). The Court found that the determinations by Smith J., that some individuals barred from 
assisted suicide would end their lives earlier than they would otherwise, had the prohibition not 
been in place, were sufficient cause to have engaged life as a value (Carter, 2015, p. 366).  
The second part of the analysis into the value of life, centered around the varying 
approaches and viewpoints as to what exactly is protected by the value (Carter, 2015, p. 366-
368). The appellants advanced the viewpoint that the value of life should protect more than just 
the preservation of physical life itself, and instead should also highlight the importance of quality 
of life, autonomy, and dignity (Carter, 2015, p. 366). The qualitative approach, supported the 
notion of dying with dignity and maintaining a good quality of life, as well as being self-
determinate and having the freedom to choose when and if, to terminate life (Carter, 2015, pp. 
366-367). Dissenting parties in both the Appeal Court for Carter [2015], and the SCC for 
Rodriguez [1993], took such an approach, suggesting that the value of life encompassed not only 
physical existence, but also an individual’s personhood, expectations for life, and the worth 
placed on life (Carter, 2015, pp. 366-367).  
The SCC opted for the approach taken by Smith J. at the trial however, maintaining that 
“…the right to life is only engaged when there is a threat of death as a result of government 
action or laws” (Carter, 2015, p. 367). In essence, the idea was that life as a value, is only 
engaged when some governmental provision harms or impedes an individual’s ability to live 
(Sharpe & Roach, 2017, p. 249). The SCC found that liberty and security of the person, would 
better address the issues of dying with dignity and having self-determinacy, as life would only 
truly be relevant, if the ability to physically exist, was being threatened (Carter, 2015, p. 367). A 
very significant distinction drawn by the Court in their explanation, was that the right to live 
does not equate to the duty to live (Carter, 2015, p. 367). The Court stated that while Canadian 
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values afforded a great significance and weight to the sanctity and preservation of life, it would 
be incorrect to suggest “… that individuals cannot “waive” their right to life” (Carter, 2015, p. 
367). Allowing individuals to refuse or withdraw from lifesaving medical treatment, showed that 
the values of liberty and security of the person are also respected values (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, 
pp. 249-250). The Court drew attention to the fact that “… the sanctity of life “is no longer seen 
to require that all human life be preserved at all costs… [and that] in certain circumstances, an 
individual’s choice about the end of her life is entitled to respect” (Carter, 2015, 367-368).  
The next portion of the analysis into s. 7, examined liberty and security of the person. 
Liberty, McLachlin C. J. noted, protected “... the right to make fundamental personal choices 
free from state interference” (Carter, 2015, p. 368), and security of the person, protected an 
individual’s right to be self-determinate and have control over one’s own body, while being free 
from governmental interference (Carter, 2015, p. 368). The Court found that both interests had 
been engaged in the present case, as the assisted suicide prohibition had the effect of limiting 
both the personal choices an individual could make in relation to their body, as well as causing 
significant psychological and/or physical suffering, by interfering with an individual’s bodily 
integrity (Carter, 2015, p. 368).  
The Court found that an individual’s choice to opt for an assisted suicide as opposed to 
any other form of palliative care, was a reflection of “... deeply personal and fundamental 
belief[s] about how they wish to live, or cease to live” (Carter, 2015, p. 370). In essence, while 
the Court recognized the importance of preserving life, attention was also drawn to the fact that 
individuals are entitled to a degree of dignity, respect, and autonomy, when making end-of-life 
decisions (Carter, 2015, pp. 369-371). The SCC concluded that s. 241(b) and s. 14 of the 
Criminal Code, had the effect of violating both liberty and security of the person, by prohibiting 
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access to assisted suicide, and by impinging on an individual’s right to consent to death in certain 
circumstances (Carter, 2015, pp. 370-371).  
The Principles of Fundamental Justice. 
The last portion of the s. 7 analysis considered whether the principles of fundamental 
justice had been violated. Before beginning the analysis, McLachlin C. J. pointed out that the 
principles of fundamental justice currently in place, were those that had been developed through 
years of s. 7 adjudication, and those that the Court had decided could not be violated, if s. 7 
values were to be protected (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, pp. 259-260). The Court had determined 
that the three most relevant principles for the case at hand, would include arbitrariness, 
overbreadth, and gross disproportionality, and that it would be necessary to measure the 
principles against the objective of the impugned provision, to determine a violation (Sharpe & 
Roach, 2017, pp. 259-260).  
Protecting vulnerable individuals from being coerced into ending their lives, was seen as 
the main objective of the assisted suicide prohibition, although Canada added that the provision 
also aimed to preserve life in general as well (Canada, 2015, p. 372). The Court found issue with 
Canada’s specification of the object of the provision (Canada, 2015, pp. 372-373). Citing that in 
Rodriguez [1993], the majority had expressly stated that the prohibition’s objective of protecting 
vulnerable people from being wrongfully forced into suicide, was only based on societal values 
surrounding the protection and preservation of human life (Canada, 2015, pp. 372-373). 
Preservation of human life was not seen to be a main objective of s. 241(b), and viewing it as 
such would be problematic according to the Court, in that it would essentially “…immunize the 
law from challenge under the Charter” (as stated in Carter, 2015, p. 373). Broad objectives such 
as the preservation of human life, would make it very difficult to suggest that the measures used 
to achieve an objective were against the principles of fundamental justice, and thus the 
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classification presented by Canada for s. 241(b), was not accepted (Carter, 2015, pp. 372-373). 
The Court further added that “... the jurisprudence requires the object of the impugned law to be 
defined precisely…  holding that the object of the prohibition should be confined to measures 
directly targeted by the law” (Carter, 2015, p. 373). Jurisprudence surrounding s. 7 essentially 
suggested that as the assisted suicide prohibition only had the effect of protecting vulnerable 
individuals from being wrongfully coaxed into obtaining an assisted suicide, that it could not be 
suggested that other objectives such as the preservation of life, or prevention of suicide, existed 
and were relevant (Carter, 2015, p. 373).  
The Court also made a point to emphasize the fundamental differences between a s. 1 
analysis, and one that determined whether the principles of fundamental justice had been violated 
(Carter, 2015 pp. 374-375). The Court stated that “… courts are not concerned with competing 
social interests or public benefits conferred by the impugned law” (Carter, 2015, p. 374), and 
that such an analysis would be appropriate only under s. 1 (Carter, 2015, p. 374). Attempting to 
provide clarification, the Court stated that the principles of fundamental justice had been “… 
derived from the essential elements of our system of justice…” (Carter, 2025, p. 374), and been 
designed to protect inherent human dignity and worth (Carter, 2015, pp. 374-375). The Court 
emphasized that violations could only exist when human dignity and worth were harmed, 
through the restriction of rights and liberties, in a manner that was arbitrary, overbroad, and/or 
grossly disproportionate (Carter, 2015, pp. 374-375). Concluding the introduction into the 
principles of fundamental justice, the Court also pointed out that s. 7 claimants would have the 
sole responsibility of proving a violation of life, liberty, and/or security of the person, as well as 
a violation of the principles of fundamental justice (Carter, 2015, p. 374); directing claimants to 
also “… establish the efficacy of the law versus its deleterious consequences… would 
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[wrongfully] impose the government’s s. 1 burden on claimants under s. 7” (as cited in Carter, 
2015, p. 374).  
 Arbitrariness. 
 Beginning the substantive analysis into the principles of fundamental justice, the Court 
defined arbitrariness as occurring when there was “… no rational connection between the object 
of the law and the limit it imposes…” (as cited in Carter, 2015, p. 375). The objective of the 
assisted suicide prohibition had already been determined to be centered around the protection of 
vulnerable individuals, from being coerced or forced into an assisted death (Carter, 2015, pp. 
372-373). The Court found that the absolute ban on assisted suicide did in fact have the effect of 
protecting vulnerable individuals from making drastic end-of-life decisions under external 
influence, and thus found that the impugned provision was not arbitrary (Carter, 2015, p. 375).  
 Overbreadth. 
 The inquiry into whether any principles of fundamental justice had been violated, 
continued with an examination into overbreadth (Carter, 2015, pp. 375-377). Overbreadth was 
defined as being relevant, when a provision unduly restricted the rights and liberties of some 
individuals, despite such restrictions not being necessary to achieve the objective of the law 
(Carter, 2015, pp. 375-376). Although the Court did not require that the provision be as 
minimally restricting as possible in the overbreadth discussion, it was determined that 
overbreadth could be violated if “… the chosen means infringe life, liberty or security of the 
person in a way that has no connection with the mischief contemplated by the legislature” 
(Carter, 2015, p. 376). In essence, if a law limited s. 7 rights in a manner that had no actual 
relation to the objective intended to be achieved by the law, such as when laws are overbroad 
simply for ease of enforcement, overbreadth could be determined to have been violated (Sharpe 
& Roach, 2017, pp. 264-267).  
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 Having defined and explained the principle of overbreadth, the Court determined that the 
reach of the impugned provision did in fact constitute a violation of the principle (Carter, 2015, 
p. 376). Canada had acknowledged that the absolute ban found in s. 241(b) actually negatively 
impacted individuals that did not need protection, in that they were not vulnerable or likely to be 
coerced into committing suicide (Carter, 2015, p. 376). As the provision was meant to protect 
only vulnerable individuals, the Court found that a violation existed, and that the law was 
overbroad (Carter, 2015, p. 376). Canada responded that creating a distinction between the 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable would be difficult, but citing similar argumentation and reasoning 
from Bedford [2013], the Court quashed the argument (Carter, 2015, p. 376). The Court found 
that s. 1 would better address issues of where to draw the line between those requiring or not 
requiring protection, as the fact of overbreadth could not be denied (Carter, 2015, p. 377).  
 Gross Disproportionality. 
 The Court turned next, to examine the principle of gross disproportionality in relation to 
the assisted suicide prohibition (Carter, 2015, pp. 378). McLachlin C. J. explained that gross 
disproportionality would have been considered to have been infringed upon, in instances where 
“... the impact of the restriction on the individual’s life, liberty or security of the person is grossly 
disproportionate to the object of the measure” (Carter, 2015, p. 377). As with the principle of 
overbreadth, the Court emphasized that the focus when determining whether the principle had 
been violated or not, was to consider not the negative impact on society, but on the individual 
alone (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, p. 267). 
Examining both the reasoning provided by the trial judge, and by Canada, the SCC 
expressed difficulty and hesitation in determining whether a gross disproportionality violation 
had occurred (Carter, 2015, pp. 377-378). The trial judge had found that a violation was in place, 
citing that “... the prohibition’s negative impact on life, liberty and security of the person was 
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“very severe” and therefore grossly disproportionate to its objective” (as cited in Carter, 2015, p. 
377). On the other hand, Canada had advanced the argument that protecting vulnerable people 
from coercion and external influence in such permanent end-of-life care decisions, was also a 
valid objective that warranted respect (Carter, 2015, p. 378).  
Further examining the principle itself, McLachlin C. J. drew particular attention to the 
fact that the threshold required to be fulfilled before gross disproportionality could be accepted 
as having been violated, was incredibly high (Carter, 2015, p. 377). Any type of 
disproportionality between the object of a law and the negative impact on an individual in terms 
of their rights restriction, could not automatically be seen as grossly disproportionate (Sharpe & 
Roach, 2017, pp. 267-269). In fact, the negative impact would have to be very significant, before 
the fundamental justice principle could be seen as having been violated (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, 
pp. 267-269). The fact that one fundamental justice principle had already been seen as being 
infringed upon, allowed the Court to avoid making a concrete determination for gross 
disproportionality in the present case (Carter, 2015, p. 378). The Court, while acknowledging 
that both sides of the debate had valid concerns, declined to consider the potential violation of 
gross disproportionality (Carter, 2015, p. 378). 
Parity.  
The last consideration in relation to the principles of fundamental justice, was concerned 
with a new principle of parity (Carter, 2015, p. 378). The appellants had asked the Court to 
consider a new fundamental justice principle, that would “... require that offenders committing 
acts of comparable blameworthiness receive sanctions of like severity” (Carter, 2015, p. 378). In 
essence, the principle would ensure that all end-of-life care practices were paired with a criminal 
sanction, as opposed to only physician assisted death being accompanied by a criminal sanction 
(Carter, 2015, p. 378). The Court declined to consider the principle however, as such a principle 
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had never before been recognized by the Court, and since it had already been determined that the 
restriction imposed by s. 241(b) violated the fundamental justice principle of overbreadth 
(Carter, 2015, p. 378). 
Section 15. 
The s. 15 claim that had been presented by the appellants was also not considered by the 
SCC (Carter, 2015, p. 378). The Court had already determined that one Charter violation was in 
place; the impugned provision infringed on life, liberty, and security of the person, and did so in 
a manner that was inconsistent with the fundamental justice principle of overbreadth (Carter, 
2015, pp. 377-378). Inquiring into a possible s. 15 violation would provide no benefit in terms of 
further repairing the harm accrued by s. 241(b), and the Court thus declined to consider a 
potential violation (Carter, 2015, p. 378). 
The Oakes Analysis. 
The last aspect of the analysis into the principles of fundamental justice, was to conduct 
the Oakes analysis to determine whether the infringement on s. 7 rights, could be reasonably 
justified (Carter, 2015, p. 378). The first step in the Oakes analysis, which asks whether the 
provision is pressing and substantial, was conceded as having been fulfilled (Carter, 2015, p. 
379). The law had been prescribed in the Criminal Code, and the objective, which was to protect 
the vulnerable from undue coercion, was unanimously seen as being valid (Carter, 2015, p. 379). 
The proportionality step of the Oakes analysis revealed some fundamental issues (Carter, 
2015, pp. 379-380). Despite admitting that “proportionality does not require perfection…” (as 
cited in Carter, 2015, p. 379), and that a degree of deference should generally be afforded to 
Parliament, the Court found that the government had erred in their actions (Carter, 2015, pp. 
379-380). The SCC found “… that the absolute prohibition could not be described as a “complex 
regulatory response”…” (as cited in Carter, 2015, p. 380) by Parliament with regards to the 
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competing issues surrounding assisted suicide, and thus that the amount of deference generally 
given to Parliament, should be decreased (Carter, 2015, p. 380).  
Inquiring further into proportionality, the Court examined the stages of rational 
connection and minimal impairment (Carter, 2015, pp. 380-388). The absolute prohibition, while 
not the ideal method of protecting vulnerable individuals from coercion into assisted suicide, was 
found to be effective in achieving the objective (Carter, 2015, pp. 380-381). The provision in 
question aimed to protect vulnerable individuals from being harmed or exploited under a more 
lax assisted suicide system; although the current enforcement system could have been better 
refined, it was overall found that “it is clearly rational to conclude that a law that bars all persons 
from accessing assistance in suicide will protect the vulnerable…” (Carter, 2015, p. 381).  
Minimal impairment was seen as having been violated through the Oakes analysis 
(Carter, 2015, pp. 381-388). The SCC made use of the evidence collected and used by the trial 
judge, to determine whether the absolute prohibition was necessary, or whether a significantly 
less impairing system could be put into place (Carter, 2015, pp. 381-383). Those opposed to 
reducing restrictions on assisted suicide, feared the consequences that would arise:  
… if the evidence showed that physicians were unable to reliably assess 
competence, voluntariness, and non-ambivalence in patients; that physicians fail 
to understand or apply the informed consent requirement for medical treatment; or 
if the evidence from permissive juris- dictions showed abuse of patients, 
carelessness, callousness, or a slippery slope, leading to the casual termination of 
life. (as cited in Carter, 2015, p. 382) 
Concerns about the permissive regime were dismissed by the trial judge, as she had found 
through extensive research and investigation, that all potential risks could be managed and 
minimized (Carter, 2015, pp. 382-383).  
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Canada argued that the conclusions presented by the trial judge were weak and not as 
heavily supported as being portrayed, however the SCC rejected this argument (Carter, 2015, pp. 
381-388). Previous cases had supported the idea that “… a trial judge’s findings on social and 
legislative facts are entitled to the same degree of deference as any other factual findings” (as 
cited in Carter, 2015, p. 384). Canada’s attempt to dispute the findings of the trial judge by 
presenting some opposing evidence, was not seen as warranting consideration (Carter, 2015, pp. 
381-388). In addition, Canada’s arguments that the assisted suicide ban should only be changed 
if all risk could be removed, was seen as unacceptable by the SCC, as the approach reversed the 
onus of proving minimal impairment or freedom from risk, onto the claimant (Carter, 2015, p. 
387). The SCC agreed with the findings of the trial judge, and thus concluded that the absolute 
ban on assisted suicide, was not justifiable (Carter, 2015, pp. 381-388).  
Remedy. 
The SCC found that s. 241(b) and s. 14 of the Criminal Code, were void due to the 
unjustifiable restriction they imposed on individuals seeking assisted suicide (Carter, 2015, p. 
389). The Court stated that the violation of s. 7 was not in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice, nor reasonably justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter. The remedy of a 
declaration of invalidity, was therefore found to be appropriate (Carter, 2015, pp. 389-390). The 
declaration of invalidity was suspended for 12 months to allow for Parliament to create new 
legislation surrounding assisted suicide, as the current system would only allow for competent 
minded, consenting adults, that were experiencing grievous and irremediable medical conditions, 
to access assisted suicide (Carter, 2015, pp. 389-390).  
Addressing a final issue, the Court noted that the decriminalization of assisted suicide did 
not impose any burden or responsibility on physicians, to oppose their morals, religion, or 
conscience, and participate in assisted death (Carter, 2015, pp. 390-391). Physicians choosing to 
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participate in such end-of-life care could do so legally, but those that did not agree with the 
practice, were under no force either (Carter, 2015, pp. 390-391). Concluding the analysis, the 
Court expressed that there was no need to issue any constitutional exemptions, instead deciding 
simply to allow the appeal with costs (Carter, 2015, pp. 391-396).  
Current Assisted Dying Legislation 
 The decision rendered in Carter [2015], lead to a new stage in the assisted death regime 
in Canada. The absolute ban on assisted dying that was subjected to scrutiny in Rodriguez 
[1993], as well as in Carter [2015], was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional, in that s. 7 
and the principles of fundamental justice had been violated in an unjustifiable manner (Carter, 
2015, pp. 389-390). Parliament was given 12 months to make amendments to the Criminal Code, 
given that the SCC had determined that assisted death would thereafter be an available option for 
every “… competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life and (2) has a 
grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that 
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances of his or her 
condition” (Carter, 2015, p. 396). 
 Parliament was unable to legislate on assisted death in time for the originally assigned 
deadline of February 6, 2016, and a four-month extension was therefore granted by the SCC 
(CBC News, “2 B.C. Women”, paras. 4-6). The new legislation was passed on June 6, 2016, and 
consisted of new and amended provisions which among other things; exempted certain people 
aiding in assisted death from criminal sanctions, specified the necessary safeguards and who is 
eligible for the procedure, made reporting certain information about assisted death mandatory, 
and which created new sanctions and offences for not complying with safeguards, or the many 
specified rules and requirements (Canada, 2019, Summary, paras. 1-5).  
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The new legislation that replaced and supplemented the absolute assisted suicide ban in s. 
241(b), can be found from s. 241 to s. 241.4 of the Criminal Code (Criminal Code, 1985). 
Prohibitions against counselling or aiding another in suicide are still found in s. 241(1), however 
s. 241(2) now outlines the exemptions available for medical assistance in dying, and ss. 241(3), 
241(4), and 241(5) specify that those aiding medical practitioners, pharmacists, and those aiding 
patients obtaining medical assistance in dying (MAID), may also be exempt from criminal 
sanctions (Criminal Code, 1985). In addition, s. 241.1 provides definitions relating to MAID, 
and ss. 241.2(1) and 241.2(2) discuss which individuals are eligible for MAID, and which 
mandatory criteria must be met before the procedure can be obtained (Criminal Code, 1985). An 
extensive list of safeguards, which includes requiring informed consent, confirmation from two 
medical practitioners for the procedure, witness confirmation, mandatory waiting periods 
between the confirmation date and date of actual procedure, and etc., can be found in s. 241.1(3) 
(Criminal Code, 1985). Lastly, the criminal sanctions that have been put in place for failure to 
comply with such safeguards, can be found in s. 241.3, and the sanctions for failure to file 
information properly and for committing forgery in relation to MAID, can be found in ss. 241.31 
and 241.4, respectively (Criminal Code, 1985). The amendments and additions made by 
Parliament, while initially having taken longer to formulate and implement, are quite extensive, 
and thus likely to help in the avoidance of potential issues with MAID.  
Critical Analysis 
Controversies Surrounding the New MAID Legislation 
 The new assisted dying legislation, while mandated by the SCC, has not been completely 
free from controversy and debate (Chochinov & Frazee, 2016, pp. 543-544). The Canadian 
government has long since expressed concerns with assisted suicide, as was seen in the 
arguments in both Rodriguez [1993], and Carter [2015]. The main qualms that conservative 
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members of Parliament fear may materialize, are that vulnerable individuals will fall prey to an 
assisted suicide system that cannot protect them from abuse (Chochinov & Frazee, 2016, p. 543), 
and that the system which now only supports assisted suicide for select individuals, will become 
one which eventually allows for euthanasia (Schafer, 2013, pp. 528-529). Advocates of assisted 
dying, while satisfied that the practice has at the very least become accessible for some 
individuals, have also raised concerns that those barred from accessing the service, will continue 
to be subjected to rights violations; for example, mature minors and those individuals that are not 
of competent mind when seeking an assisted death, will be among the many of those excluded 
from the practice (Kermode-Scott, 2016, paras. 6-8). Opponents of the practice continue to raise 
concerns of the many potential risks that could actualize, while advocates suggest that the 
constitutionality of the new MAID legislation, may need to be revisited in terms of potential ss. 7 
and 15(1) violations (Kermode-Scott, 2016, paras. 6-10).  
 Opponents of Assisted Death. 
 Concerns surrounding assisted death centre mainly around the idea of a descent into a 
permissive and lax regime, which will be unable to shield vulnerable individuals from abuse and 
exploitation (Govier, 2005, para. 1). The “slippery slope” argument essentially suggests that a 
system which allows physician assisted death for those individuals identified by the SCC, will 
eventually become a more sinister system which allows not only for voluntary death, but for 
involuntary death, and death for those individuals who have few valid reasons for pursuing such 
medical procedures (Shariff, 2012, pp. 146-147). Conservative Parliament essentially fears that 
the decriminalization of assisted suicide for some individuals, will inevitably lead to the 
allowance and infliction of assisted death onto those who can be easily coerced and manipulated 
(Schafer, 2013, p. 528), and/or the allowance of involuntary euthanasia; the infliction of death 
onto another person who does not, or cannot freely consent (Shariff, 2012, pp. 146-147).  
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 The argument that preservation of life is not the only valid consideration when attempting 
to ensure sanctity of life, was recognized and accepted by the opposition (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 
594-596). In supporting the complete ban on assisted suicide in the interest of protecting the 
vulnerable, and avoiding the devaluation of human life, it was understood that quality of life is 
also an important consideration in end-of-life care decisions (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). 
Groups opposing assisted suicide, found that lifting the absolute ban would, among other issues, 
decrease the quality of palliative care in Canada (Schafer, 2013, p. 525). Conservative members 
of Parliament raised concerns that it would be illogical to “…offer expensive comfort care to 
dying patients when it is cheaper simply to offer them the option of a hastened death” (Schafer, 
2013, p. 529). The slippery descent into a society which placed little value on human life, and 
thus allowed for voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, and which created the possibility for 
misconduct and mistakes, would be inevitable, conservatives argued (Shariff, 2012, pp. 146-
147). 
Apprehension towards a permissive assisted death regime, also stems from the fact that 
sanctity of life has long been a protected and greatly valued quality in Canadian society 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). Ethical and moral issues surrounding assisted suicide have been 
a primary concern in the debate; the question being grappled, is whether a balance can be struck 
between the desire to protect the value of human life, and the desire to allow individuals to exert 
autonomy over their own bodies (Chochinov & Frazee, 2016, p. 543). Concerns were also raised 
on whether physicians would be in ethical support of the practice; would those individuals 
dedicated to healing and preserving life, find a practice that hastened and inflicted death, to be 
ethically and morally acceptable (Upshur, 2016, pp. 545-546)? In addition, opponents of assisted 
death emphasized the problematic nature of articulating public support of suicide in any form, 
especially amidst a time of multiple suicide crises in Indigenous communities across Canada 
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(Upshur, 2016, pp. 545-546). Similarly, attention was drawn to the idea that the availability of 
assisted death, would increase the guilt felt by some individuals opting for other end-of-life care 
practices (Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). Parliamentary members opposing PAD suggested that 
it would be paramount to ensure that individuals in alternative end-of-life care, understood that 
their lives were of value, and that their existence was not a burden on any person or system 
(Rodriguez, 1993, pp. 594-596). Opponents of assisted death, emphasized through their 
arguments, the importance of spreading the message that human life is valuable, and thus worth 
protection and preservation (Schafer, 2013, pp. 525-526). 
Proponents of Assisted Death.  
Supporters of the decriminalization of assisted death, have found issue with the fact that 
many individuals will be barred from accessing the service, despite recent legalization 
(Chochinov & Frazee, 2016, pp. 543-544). The current assisted death legislation allows MAID 
only for those individuals that among other requirements; are at least 18 years of age; are of 
sound mind and capable of making their own decisions; possess a grievous and irremediable 
medical condition; are very likely to naturally die in the reasonably foreseeable future; and that 
have provided informed consent for the procedure (Criminal Code, 1985). The safeguards for 
assisted death, while implemented with the intention of protecting vulnerable individuals from 
potential abuses and misconduct, serve to deprive others of their right to access MAID, and to 
die with dignity (Chochinov & Frazee, 2016, pp. 543-544).  
The restrictive nature of the MAID legislation created by Parliament in 2016, has lead to 
concerns surrounding the constitutionality of such limitations (Upshur, 2016, pp. 545-546). 
Proponents of assisted dying have found particular issue with the idea that mature minors, or 
individuals suffering from mental illnesses, or those who suffer heavily despite death not 
necessarily being reasonably foreseeable; or those that would like to opt for a physician assisted 
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death in advance, due to illnesses that would prevent doing so later on, would be unable seek 
MAID under the current legislation (Webster, 2016, p. 1893). Upshur (2016) reports that the new 
MAID legislation has already begun to be challenged, and that disputes are likely to continue, 
until a higher degree of equality is achieved in terms of end-of-life decision making (p. 545).  
Advocates of a permissive assisted death system have advanced the argument that ss. 7 
and 15(1) violations may be occurring due to the new MAID legislation (Upshur, 2016, pp. 545-
546). The restrictive laws put in place by Parliament, essentially continue to have the same 
negative impacts as articulated in Rodriguez [1993], and in Carter [2015], by preventing certain 
classes of individuals from accessing assisted death (Upshur, 2016, pp. 545-546). The laws may 
prove to be grossly disproportionate after having violated life, liberty, and security of the person, 
by having a significant and unnecessary negative impact, by preventing individuals from being 
self-determinate and autonomous in their end-of-life decisions (Carter, 2015, p. 377). In 
addition, the impugned legislation may prove to be discriminatory by restricting MAID to only 
certain classes of individuals, and thus depriving others of their right to equal benefit and 
protection of the law (Canadian Charter, 1982, s 15(1)).  
Resolving Controversies. 
Controversies surrounding MAID are not likely to subside until the concerns raised by 
both opponents and proponents of the practice, are addressed in a serious and conclusive manner. 
The Government of Canada (2018) has thoroughly supervised MAID since its legalization, and 
provided three interim reports which have helped to showcase the need, value, and effectiveness 
of the new legislation, as well as highlight areas requiring improvement (“Monitoring and 
Reporting”, paras. 1-3). Reporting on MAID will continue to occur, so as to ensure that no 
misconduct, abuse, or exploitation is taking place, and also simply to provide a detailed outline 
of MAID in Canada (Health Canada, 2018, para. 4). Individuals and groups opposing assisted 
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death can find solace in the fact that MAID is being consistently supervised and scrutinized, and 
therefore that any potential risks will likely be effectively managed, if they do happen to 
materialize.  
The issues presented by proponents of assisted death, have also been somewhat addressed 
through the independent reports conducted by the Council of Canadian Academies (CCA) 
(Government of Canada, 2018, Independent Reviews, paras. 1-4). The CCA has conducted 
research into the possibility of extending MAID to mature minors, those with mental illnesses as 
sole reasons for seeking MAID, and those who would require advance requests for MAID, due to 
deteriorating mental and physical conditions (Government of Canada, 2018, Independent 
Reviews, paras. 1-4). Relevant claims, evidence, and safeguards, have been examined and 
discussed in the available studies thus far (Council of Canadian Academies, 2019, Overview, 
paras. 1-2). The reports, although not able to resolve the issues surrounding the constitutionality 
of the restrictive MAID legislation, have served to provide insight into what could potentially 
become a more permissive assisted death regime (Council of Canadian Academies, 2019, 
Overview, paras. 1-2).  
Constitutionality of the New MAID Legislation 
Implementation of new MAID legislation has lead to claims that the ss. 7 and 15(1) 
Charter rights of certain individuals are being violated (British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association, 2016, “Troubling Aspects”, paras. 1-5). Parliament’s decision to refuse to allow 
MAID for specific classes of people, including mature minors, the mentally ill, and those 
requiring advance directives, has forced the assisted dying debate to continue, and Court 
challenges to come forth (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2016, “Troubling 
Aspects”, paras. 1-5). The life, liberty, and security of the person interests of certain classes of 
people are seen to have been violated by the new assisted dying laws, in that governmental 
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interferences have had the effect of preventing such individuals from exercising control over 
their own bodies and lives (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2016, “Troubling 
Aspects”, paras. 1-5). In addition, s. 15(1) rights are thought to have been violated because 
restrictions have been placed on individuals simply due to their age, and mental disability; such 
individuals are unable to enjoy equal protection and benefit of the law, due to unfair 
discrimination (Criminal Code, 1985). Problematic policies have ensured that individuals 
excluded from accessing MAID, continue the fight for fair and accessible end-of-life care 
(British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2016, “Troubling Aspects”, paras. 1-5). 
The Section Seven Claim 
 The s. 7 claim by individuals excluded by the current legislation, would essentially mirror 
the claims presented in Rodriguez [1993], and in Carter [2015]. The appellants in Carter [2015] 
just as in Rodriguez [1993], had suggested that the absolute prohibition on assisted dying, had 
the effect of infringing upon individuals life, liberty, and security of the person rights (Carter, 
2015, p. 360). The examination conducted in Carter [2015] by the SCC, found that the appellant 
claims had been correct, and that all three s. 7 values had in fact been engaged and violated 
(Carter, 2015, pp. 366-371).  
 Life. 
 The effect of the recent MAID provisions is very similar to the negative effects that were 
imposed by the absolute assisted suicide ban of s. 241(b). The current MAID legislation engages 
the s. 7 value of life, by potentially forcing individuals to commit to death, much earlier than 
they would otherwise (Carter, 2015, p. 366). Individuals suffering from deteriorating mental 
conditions, may feel pressure to commit suicide prematurely, knowing that they will be unable to 
do so, at a later time when they truly feel they would like to die (Carter, 2015, p. 366). The 
refusal of Parliament to accept advance directives for assisted death, essentially imposes two 
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cruel choices on an individual. First, they can commit suicide prematurely. Second, they can 
choose to live an unhappy life that will likely be characterized by a loss of personhood and 
dignity, until natural death occurs.  
The assisted death prohibitions also have the effect of imposing a “duty to live”, by 
excluding certain classes of individuals from accessing assisted death services. Mature minors 
are essentially defined as those individuals that are under the age of 18, yet deemed to be mature 
enough to be able to make independent decisions regarding health care (Department of Justice, 
2019, “Proceedings About Health”, para. 1). Mature minors, along with any other class of 
individual, currently hold the right to refuse, or withdraw from medical treatment (Carter, 2015, 
p. 367). The ability to refuse lifesaving treatment suggests that the Court recognizes that the 
preservation of life, is not always paramount to other rights; quality of life is also an important 
value that must be recognized and respected (Carter, 2015, pp. 367-368). The notion that certain 
individuals, especially those experiencing grievous and irremediable medical conditions at young 
ages, or those with severe and intolerable mental illnesses, or those with diminishing mental 
capacity should be barred from MAID, is illogical. Canadian jurisprudence has already 
acknowledged that individuals can sometimes waive their right to life. To bar those individuals 
most in need, from valuable end-of-life care services, simply attacks their s. 7 right to life, while 
also serving to further diminish their quality of life (Carter, 2015, p. 367). The new assisted 
suicide provisions violate the value of life, as the “…law or state action imposes death or an 
increased risk of death…” on those individuals currently excluded from accessing the practice 
(Carter, 2015, p. 367).  
Liberty. 
The MAID legislation enacted after Carter [2015], can also be seen as having violated 
the s. 7 value of liberty. The claims advanced by the appellants in Carter [2015] are reflected in 
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terms of the liberty violation in the present case, in that one effect of the new MAID legislation, 
is to violate “… the right to make fundamental personal choices free from state interference” (as 
cited in Carter, 2015, p. 368). The recently enacted provisions restrict certain groups of 
individuals seeking MAID, from being able to make deeply personal choices (e.g. mature 
minors, those requiring advance requests, and those experiencing mental illnesses). The stringent 
requirements found in the assisted dying laws, impose state control over individuals personal life 
choices, and also prevent the execution of such decisions.  
Security of the Person.  
Security of the person is characterized as being the s. 7 value which protects autonomy, 
and the ability of an individual to have control over their own physical and psychological 
integrity (Carter, 2015, pp. 368-371). The s. 7 value is again, violated in the same manner in the 
present situation, as it was in Rodriguez [1993], and in Carter [2015]. In essence, the 
governmental interference- to forbid those individuals that do not meet the requirements laid out 
in s. 241.2(1) of the Criminal Code- has the effect of harming an individual’s ability to be self-
determinate. The prohibitions in the new MAID legislation prevent specific classes of 
individuals from living in a manner that “…is consistent with their life-long values and that 
reflects their life experience” (as cited in Carter, 2015, p. 369), because the opportunity to make 
serious intimate decisions, is denied.  
The s. 7 value is also infringed upon, in that individuals are being denied the right to die 
in a dignified manner. The people seeking to obtain the drastic measure of MAID in the present 
case, are those individuals who are already suffering heavily in a physical and psychological 
sense (Carter, 2015, pp. 370-371). The emphasis that Canadian society has, and continues to 
place, on the sanctity of life, ensures that such decisions are not taken lightly, and that 
individuals accessing assisted death services, are those that have genuine need (Carter, 2015, pp. 
ASSISTED DEATH AND SECTION SEVEN OF THE CHARTER 50 
387-388). The decision to continue to prevent mature minors, the mentally ill, and those 
requiring advance requests, would be one which emphasized that the dignity, autonomy, 
personhood, and suffering, of some individuals, is not recognized nor respected, in Canada 
(Carter, 2015, pp. 368-371).  
The Principles of Fundamental Justice 
The confirmation that life, liberty, and security of the person have been infringed, leads 
to the next step of making a determination of whether any principles of fundamental justice, have 
been violated by the impugned legislation. The SCC, in formulating the conditions required to 
obtain a physician assisted death, simply ensured that no s. 7 values were being violated, with 
particular reference to the fundamental justice principles of arbitrariness and overbreadth 
(Carter, 2015, pp. 389-390). The Court did not consider whether any infringements for the 
fundamental justice principle of gross disproportionality existed, when examining the 
constitutionality of the absolute ban, and many concerns have been raised over the bypass, 
especially in light of the new legislation (British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2019, 
“Get the Facts”, paras. 2-3).  
Gross Disproportionality.  
The fundamental justice principle of gross disproportionality is a fairly recent 
development in the Canadian jurisprudence surrounding s. 7 (Sharpe & Roach, 2017, pp. 267-
268). The principle was first fully recognized in Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community 
Services Society [2011], in which it was stated that, “gross disproportionality describes state 
actions or legislative responses to a problem that are so extreme as to be disproportionate to any 
legitimate government interest…” (PHS Community Services Society, 2011, p. 187). In essence, 
the principle can be seen as having been engaged and/or violated, when it has been determined 
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that the drastic negative impacts of the provision, are severely detached from the originally 
intended objectives (PHS Community Services Society, 2011, p. 187).  
The understanding of gross disproportionality was refined in Canada (Attorney General) 
v. Bedford [2013], when the Court further elaborated on the fundamental doctrine (Bedford, 
2013, pp. 1150-1152). Gross disproportionality, the SCC explained, was a principle that focused 
only on the severe negative impacts incurred by an individual person; the s.1 balancing of 
salutary and deleterious effects, was clarified as being the only instance in which the positive or 
negative impact to society, would be considered (Bedford, 2013, pp. 1150-1151). The Court 
emphasized that claimants for s. 7 would not need to weigh the negative impacts personally 
accrued, against the potential positive benefits to society, as such a task would be more 
appropriately addressed in an Oakes analysis (Bedford, 2013, p. 1151). The s. 7 principle would 
be determined to have been violated, even on the basis of a single individual being able to prove 
that their s. 7 rights had been infringed upon, in a manner where the intense, negative effects of 
the provision, were severely inconsistent with the stated objectives of that provision (Bedford, 
2013, pp. 1150-1152). 
Expanding further on the fundamental justice principle, the Court emphasized that 
violations of gross disproportionality would only be considered valid, in very extreme 
circumstances (Bedford, 2013, pp. 1150-1151). Gross disproportionality was characterized as the 
principle applicable when the disconnect between the impact of the law and its stated purpose, 
was severe enough that society would find no logical or rational reasons, to support such an 
inconsistency (Bedford, 2013, pp. 1151-1152). A minor discrepancy between the objective and 
the impact, or a law that imposed only trivial harms onto an individual, would not meet the 
criteria of gross disproportionality; both the negative impact actually felt, and the inconsistency 
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with the stated objective, would have to be very severe for the principle to apply (Bedford, 2013, 
pp. 1151-1152).   
The Present Case.  
The fundamental justice principle of gross disproportionality can be considered to have 
been violated in the present situation. The recently enacted MAID laws serve to deprive certain 
classes of individuals, of their rights to life, liberty, and security of the person, in a very severe 
manner. Individuals suffering from grievous and irremediable medical conditions, and seeking 
MAID while they are mature minors; or those suffering from degenerative disorders, and thus 
seeking MAID through advance directives; or those seeking MAID while suffering strictly from 
severe mental illnesses; or those experiencing grievous and irremediable medical conditions 
where death is not reasonably foreseeable, are all denied their s. 7 rights.  
The SCC explained in Bedford [2013], that a violation of gross disproportionality could 
be determined, based on “… whether the law’s purpose, taken at face value, is connected to its 
effects and whether the negative effect is grossly disproportionate to the law’s purpose” (p. 
1152). The purpose of the assisted dying laws in question, essentially mirrors the purpose of the 
absolute prohibition on assisted suicide, but in a less restrictive manner; to ensure that the lives 
of vulnerable individuals are given an appropriate amount of respect and dignity, and to ensure 
that such individuals are not wrongfully coerced into making the drastic decision to obtain an 
assisted death (Carter, 2015, p. 378).  
The effect of the impugned provisions and stringent conditions on assisted death, have 
been to ensure that many of the individuals needing MAID most, are denied access to the service 
(Dying with Dignity Canada, 2018, paras. 2-6). Many of those suffering heavily due to grievous 
and irremediable medical conditions are unable to access MAID due to the trivial requirements 
imposed by the legislation (Dying with Dignity Canada, 2018, paras. 2-6). The negative impacts 
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of the new MAID laws are also very severe, in that some of the individuals most needing such 
end-of-life care services, will be forced to choose between two cruel and harsh fates; the choice 
to suffer unhappily and discontentedly until a natural death, or to commit suicide in an unideal, 
and potentially illegal, time and manner (Carter, 2015, p. 343). Individuals unable to obtain an 
assisted death, will also be harmed through the s. 7 life, liberty, and security of the person 
violations incurred; knowing that the state does not value the autonomy, dignity, and personhood 
of all people, will cause severe harm (Dying with Dignity Canada, 2018, paras. 2-5).  
The purpose of the assisted dying legislation in question is clearly connected to the actual 
effects that have ensued. The desire to ensure that vulnerable individuals are safe from the 
potential misconduct, exploitation, mistakes, and abuses of a permissive assisted death regime, is 
fulfilled by restricting MAID to only a narrow scope of individuals. The problem with the 
legislation arises however, when the next step in the gross disproportionality analysis is 
examined; are the negative impacts of the impugned legislation, grossly disproportionate to the 
stated purpose of the legislation? (Bedford, 2013, p. 1152). Gross disproportionality can be 
considered to have been violated, because the effects of the recently enacted MAID legislation, 
are in fact grossly disproportionate to the object of the law.  
The new MAID legislation imposes the same effect that was placed on individuals 
deprived of assisted suicide in Rodriguez [1993], and in Carter [2015], on additional categories 
of individuals. The effect of the deprivation on life, liberty, and security of the person, is very 
significant and extreme, as impacted individuals will be made to endure intolerable suffering for 
unjustifiable periods of time, or be forced to illegally end their lives with the aid of another 
person (Carter, 2015, pp. 377-378). Smith J., at the trial decision before Carter [2015], noted 
that negative effect imposed by the absolute prohibition was “…very severe… [and] grossly 
disproportionate to its effect on preventing inducement of vulnerable people to commit suicide, 
ASSISTED DEATH AND SECTION SEVEN OF THE CHARTER 54 
promoting palliative care, protecting physician-patient relationships, protecting vulnerable 
people, and upholding the state interest in the preservation of human life” (Carter, 2012, para. 
1378). The effect of the newfound restrictive MAID laws is very similar; in effect, the impugned 
legislation deprives individuals of their life, liberty, and security of the person, in a manner that 
is very harsh and significant, and which is completely unnecessary to fulfill the objectives of 
protecting vulnerable individuals from abuse and exploitation, and preserving the sanctity of life. 
The analysis into gross disproportionality suggests that the restrictive MAID legislation enacted 
by Parliament in 2016, is problematic, in that the s. 7 values of life, liberty, and security of the 
person, are violated in a manner not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.  
 The Oakes Analysis. 
 The determination that the assisted dying legislation in question, violates s. 7 in a manner 
that is not in harmony with the principles of fundamental justice, requires that the Oakes analysis 
be done next. The first portion of the Oakes analysis asks whether a pressing and substantive 
need exists for the legislation, and its objective (Oakes, 1986, para. 69). The impugned 
legislation aims to protect vulnerable individuals by preventing coercion into assisted suicide, by 
recognizing individual autonomy, and by aiming “… to affirm the inherent and equal value of 
every person’s life and to avoid encouraging negative perceptions of the quality of life of persons 
who are elderly, ill or disabled…” (Government of Canada, 2016, Preamble, paras. 1-4). The 
objective of the legislation is clearly pressing and substantial, as it serves to address important 
social issues surrounding the sanctity and value of human life.  
 The next portion of the Oakes analysis asks whether a rational connection exists between 
the objectives of the legislation, and the means chosen to achieve such objectives (Oakes, 1986, 
para. 77). The impugned legislation employs the restrictive and stringent conditions required for 
assisted suicide eligibility, as the means to achieve the stated objectives. The means have the 
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effect of limiting assisted suicide to only those individuals that are over the age of 18, suffering 
from grievous and irremediable medical conditions, whose death is reasonably foreseeable, and 
who possess full mental competence (Criminal Code, 1985). These individuals do not meet the 
stated requirements, are denied access to MAID, and are thus unprotected, no matter how 
vulnerable, or invulnerable. The rational connection portion of the Oakes analysis is very 
evidently satisfied, because the restrictive nature of the MAID legislation, has the effect of 
protecting all individuals denied assisted suicide, from being susceptible to abuse and 
exploitation. 
 The Oakes analysis inquires then, into whether the Charter infringement imposed by the 
impugned legislation, is minimally impairing (Oakes, 1986, para. 70). In the present situation, 
the negative impact of the restrictive MAID laws is obviously very severe and detrimental, just 
as the absolute prohibition was in Rodriguez [1993], and in Carter [2015]. No evidence or 
confirmation was provided, which would have indicated that the means chosen to achieve the 
objectives set out in the MAID legislation, were as minimally restricting as possible. The 
impugned legislation, and accompanying eligibility requirements and safeguards, serve to protect 
the respect that has long since been afforded to the sanctity of human life in Canadian society. 
Unfortunately, the law does not adequately take into consideration, the level of respect that 
autonomy and dignity, must be afforded. Aiming to protect the vulnerable from abuse, 
exploitation, and coercion, the impugned provision imposes a significant harm onto vulnerable, 
and already suffering individuals.  
 Problematically, thorough explanations for the stringent restrictions were not provided, 
and they were implemented despite a vast array of evidence and support suggesting that such 
harsh limitations were not needed. Advocates for a more permissive assisted dying regime 
argued that “…assessments of vulnerability and competence are routinely made in individual 
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cases”, and that it was therefore unnecessary for Parliament and the courts, to be so restrictive 
(British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, 2016, “Troubling Aspects”, para. 2). Recent 
reports commissioned by the CCA have examined requests into MAID for mature minors, for 
those requiring advance requests, and for those seeking MAID with the sole condition of a 
mental illness (Council of Canadian Academies, 2019, Summary, paras. 1-2). The findings of the 
reports, while unable to conclusively determine the safety and effectiveness of safeguards, have 
suggested that assessments for MAID on an individual basis, would likely be acceptable, and 
able to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals (Council of Canadian Academies, 2018, 
pp. 14-39). 
A lack of evidence supporting a restrictive assisted dying system, along with the effect of 
the provision being so severely harmful, suggests that the impugned legislation is not minimally 
impairing. The failure of the MAID legislation to fulfill the criteria required for minimum 
impairment, shows that the legislation is not demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic 
society. As minimum impairment was determined to be violated, it is not necessary to consider 
the last Oakes step, of balancing salutary and deleterious effects.  
The Section Fifteen Claim 
 The Kapp test (see R. v. Kapp [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483) must be conducted to determine 
whether a s. 15(1) violation exists due to the assisted dying legislation found in the Criminal 
Code, from s. 241 to s. 241.4 (Criminal Code, 1985). The first step in the Kapp test, asks 
whether the law creates a distinction based on the enumerated or analogous grounds found in s. 
15(1). 
 The MAID legislation in question, restricts assisted dying to only those individuals that 
meet certain criteria, and is exclusionary on the basis of age, and mental and physical disability 
(Criminal Code, 1985). Individuals eligible for MAID, include those that are; eligible for public 
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health care in Canada, a minimum of 18 years of age, able to make decisions regarding their own 
health, suffering from a grievous and irremediable medical condition, voluntarily requesting 
MAID of their own volition, and those that are able to provide informed consent (Criminal Code, 
1985). In addition, safeguards for MAID require that natural death be reasonably foreseeable, 
before an individual can be considered to be suffering from a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition (Criminal Code, 1985). The distinctions present in the legislation, namely that only 
those individuals that are age 18 and above, of full mental competence, and likely to die naturally 
in the foreseeable future, will be able to seek and receive MAID, are problematic. The impugned 
legislation fulfills the first portion of the Kapp test, as it creates direct distinctions on the basis of 
age, and mental and physical disability.  
 The second portion of the Kapp test asks whether the distinctions created by the 
impugned legislation, further serve to create disadvantages by perpetuating prejudices and 
stereotypes. The newly enacted MAID legislation, creates clear distinctions on the basis of three 
enumerated grounds found in s. 15(1), and the distinctions allow for problematic prejudices and 
stereotypes to become further engrained. Disallowing certain individuals from accessing assisted 
death services, sends the message that such individuals are incapable of being autonomous and 
of making their own decisions regarding fundamental and personal life matters. Prejudices and 
stereotypes of the same nature, dominate discussions regarding younger individuals, and those 
with mental and/or physical disabilities, and imply that some individuals are lesser than others.  
The created distinctions are problematic, because their suggestions that the individuals 
excluded from MAID cannot be self-determinate, and are thus in need of external assistance and 
guidance, are not accurate. Assessments on a case-by-case basis are enough to prove that all 
younger people, or those suffering from mental or physical disabilities, are not alike. Instead, 
individuals differ in their maturity levels, competence levels, and values and beliefs. Completely 
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barring entire classes of people from having access to valuable end-of-life care services, simply 
perpetuates the prejudices and stereotypes that most individuals under the age of 18, along with 
those suffering from mental and physical disabilities, are incapable of making serious decisions 
for themselves, and thus unable to be self-determinate or autonomous. Individual capabilities, as 
well as values such as human dignity, autonomy, and privacy, are affronted, when such 
prejudices are allowed to flourish and expand.   
 The analysis of the Kapp test demonstrates that a s. 15(1) infringement is caused by the 
MAID legislation being examined. The MAID laws do not pass the Kapp test, in that they create 
distinction based on enumerated grounds, and also because they allow for that distinction to be 
further harmful, by perpetuating prejudices and stereotypes. The impugned legislation must 
undergo a s. 1 Oakes analysis, which will determine whether the infringement is acceptable.  
The Oakes Analysis. 
 Pressing and Substantive Need.  
 The first portion of the Oakes analysis asks whether a substantive and pressing need 
exists for the legislation and objective being questioned. The objective of the MAID laws, has 
been articulated as helping to ensure that vulnerable individuals are not wrongfully induced into 
making permanent end-of-life decisions, and instead are only making the decision for MAID, of 
their own free will. Safeguards and regulations surrounding assisted suicide are necessary, as 
they ensure that no abuse or exploitation occurs, and also that only those truly requiring assisted 
death services, are those being allowed access. Regulations also help to ensure that human 
dignity and sanctity of life are respected, and that palliative care services in Canada do not 
diminish in quality. The first criteria of the Oakes analysis is very clearly fulfilled, as the MAID 
laws do in fact, satisfy a substantive and pressing need.  
  
ASSISTED DEATH AND SECTION SEVEN OF THE CHARTER 59 
Rational Connection.  
 The next portion of the Oakes analysis questions whether the measures adopted by the 
impugned legislation, have a rational connection to the stated objectives. The objectives of the 
MAID legislation enacted after Carter [2015], are well intentioned and logical in nature, 
focusing on protecting susceptible individuals from an abusive system which could force them 
into assisted death. Parliament’s fears that a permissive assisted suicide system would be 
inadequate in protecting people from being induced and manipulated into obtaining MAID, 
resulted in the formulation and implementation of restrictions which would protect the 
vulnerable (Carter, 2015, p. 373). The measures employed by the impugned provisions, are in 
fact rationally connected to the stated objectives; preventing vulnerable classes of individuals 
from accessing MAID, ensures that they are shielded from being coerced into obtaining an 
assisted death. 
 Minimal Impairment.  
Minimal impairment is the step in the Oakes analysis which demands that the impugned 
legislation inflict the most minimal impairment on Charter rights. McLachlin C. J., in Carter 
[2015], found that “the burden is on the government to show the absence of less drastic means of 
achieving the objective…” (p. 381). In the present case, Parliament failed to adequately explain 
how and why the chosen restrictions, were the most minimally impairing, and thus the most 
appropriate measures to adopt.  
Substantial amounts of evidence and support suggested that assessing qualification for 
MAID on an individual, or case-by-case basis, would be effective in ensuring that vulnerable 
individuals were not exposed to risk and harm (Carter, 2015, pp. 381-383). A thorough 
investigation had been conducted, and data from scientists, physicians, other jurisdictions which 
allow MAID, was used to make the determination that a permissive regime could be allowed in 
ASSISTED DEATH AND SECTION SEVEN OF THE CHARTER 60 
Canada. Furthermore, the SCC in Carter [2015], had agreed with the findings from the trial 
judge, that an overwhelming amount of evidence and information, backed the notion that any 
potential risks surrounding assisted suicide, could be minimized through a properly regulated 
system (Carter, 2015, pp. 381-383). Addressing specifically, disadvantaged and vulnerable 
populations such as the disabled, the trial judge concluded that evidence from other permissive 
jurisdictions had proved that such individuals were not at an increased risk of experiencing bias 
or abuse (Carter, 2015, p. 383). The findings suggested that the implementation of safeguards, 
such as the requirement for informed consent, would successfully protect individuals from harm, 
and likely result in the development of more robust and fulsome end-of-life healthcare systems, 
in Canada (Carter, 2015, pp. 382-383). 
The decision of Parliament to then create restrictive MAID legislation, is 
incomprehensible. The impugned legislation, while well intentioned and attempting only to 
protect vulnerable individuals, has had the actual effect of imposing undue pain and suffering 
onto individuals barred from valuable end-of-life care. Requiring that those accessing MAID are 
of a certain age, mental ability, and certain stage in their illness, shows the desire to ensure that 
no mistakes, or purposeful wrongdoings occur; while having an active role in the assisted dying 
process would be ideal, doing so is not practical or possible, for all of those individuals that 
would be most likely to access MAID, and benefit most from such services. 
 Additionally, preventing certain classes of individuals from accessing MAID, may 
actually achieve the opposite effect intended by the impugned legislation. Concerns that initial 
requests for MAID may become unwanted closer to the date of the actual procedure, cannot 
adequately be addressed by the implemented safeguards; forcing an individual to wait for a 
natural death, or to commit suicide prematurely, would be equally as heinous. Those individuals 
that would be unable to articulate changed viewpoints for MAID due to deteriorating conditions 
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or other obstacles, would experience significant disrepute to dignity, autonomy, and personhood, 
if their requests were ignored while still able to be expressed. The least harmful option to ensure 
that only those most in need of MAID were accessing such services, would be to become more 
lax in terms of the restrictions placed on individuals such as mature minors, and the mentally ill. 
A more permissive, yet properly regulated system, would be able to tackle the needs and wants 
of patients seeking MAID, while also addressing Parliamentary concerns, and ensuring that 
vulnerable individuals were protected from harm, that a slippery slope did not develop, and that 
Canada’s healthcare system did not falter. 
  The impugned legislation would not pass the Oakes test at the minimal impairment stage, 
and thus cannot be considered to be justifiable in a free and democratic society. The 
infringements on s. 15(1) rights are much too severe to be deemed acceptable, and the 
restrictions preventing mature minors, those requiring advance requests, and those suffering from 
mental illnesses, from obtaining MAID, cannot stand. 
Conclusion 
The examination into s. 7 and assisted death, has been telling of the changes that have 
occurred throughout time, in societal and legal understandings of the Charter, and pertinent 
controversial matters. The Court interpretation of s. 7 during the time of Rodriguez [1993], was 
considerably underdeveloped and unrefined in comparison to the understanding which was 
applied in later cases such as PHS Community Services Society [2011], Bedford [2013], and 
Carter [2015]. The interpretation of the fundamental Charter section, which has the ability to 
impact the most important and personal decisions taken by Canadians, is everchanging.  
The matter of physician assisted death continues to be one that is quite relevant and 
controversial, despite the fact that the SCC rendered a decision legalizing the practice, in 2015. 
The post-Carter era of medical assistance in dying continues to be characterized by a deep divide 
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between proponents and opponents of the matter, and as with any other heavily contentious 
issue, it is unlikely that harmony between the opposing sides will be achieved anytime in the 
foreseeable future. Although the decision in Carter [2015] technically settled the matter of which 
individuals are eligible for MAID and when, many issues have yet to be considered or resolved. 
The SCC in its unanimous decision declined to speak on the potential s.15(1) violations that the 
current legislation poses, and also did not clarify the meaning, application, or interpretation of 
the fundamental principle of gross disproportionality (Carter, 2015, p. 396). The decision in 
Carter [2015] while effectively solidifying the Court’s stance and interpretation of s.7, has not 
had the effect of completely and definitively putting the matter of physician assisted death, to 
rest. The interpretation of s. 7 is bound to continue to evolve, especially in relation to assisted 
death, as relevant issues are considered and resolved.  
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